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80 A RT I C L E
Global Health 
Governance
Conflicts on Global Social Rights
W O L F G A N G  H E I N  A N D  L A R S  K O H L M O R G E N
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Germany
abstract This article analyses the impact of new
institutional structures in global health governance (GHG)
on the realization of social rights in poor countries. Focusing
on the example of global HIV/AIDS politics. The article
argues that new governance modes increase the participation
of civil society groups and affected communities, but also that
they are frequently instrumentalized by powerful actors to
pursue their particular interests. In fact, increasing resources
are mobilized for the fight against poverty-related diseases.
The article concludes that, as the experience of HIV/AIDS
politics, the conflicts around the TRIPS Agreement and the
development of Global Public-Private Partnerships GPPPs
suggest, GHG is characterized by a combination of moral
values and material interests that does not guarantee a
comprehensive realization of social rights, but which allows
some progress in the fight against poverty-related diseases – a
step toward realization of social rights.
keywords developing countries, global health governance, global
social rights, HIV/AIDS politics, international organizations, new
governance modes
Introduction
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that:
‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services … ’. This right was reinforced by
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Art. 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ESCRs), a legally binding instrument concluded in 1966 and ratified
by all Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries with the exception of the USA. In the 1970s, international discus-
sions about a new international economic order and the World Bank’s basic
needs strategy focused at least partially on the need to help developing coun-
tries fulfil the duties they had taken on with this covenant. Later on, however,
the politics of neoliberal globalization (trade liberalization, structural adjust-
ment) gave little priority to global social rights, the fulfilment of which was
rather seen as a consequence of economic growth.
At present, the strong focus on the Millennium Development Goals indi-
cates that it has again become widely acknowledged that there is a need for
addressing social and economic rights more directly. Four developments can
be seen as the cornerstones that characterize the problems and opportunities
for progress in this field:
1. An extensive body of legal contracts defining the rules of the international
economic system with the aim of laying the basis for a liberalized global
economy has been consolidated – basically the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreements.
2. We find a renewed and strengthened concern for global social justice as an
essential value, on the intellectual level as well as on the level of global civil
society activities as a reaction to the growing social and economic inequal-
ity accompanying the process of economic globalization. Globalized com-
munication and social interactions have increased the awareness of the
scandal of widespread poverty and poverty-related illnesses. Civil society
actors – particularly non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – gained
more importance in global politics due to a lack of emphasis on these issues
by many ‘traditional’ international governmental organizations (IGOs)
and nation states in the ‘high time’ of neoliberalism during most of the
1980s and 1990s. Additionally, some IGOs are weakened by a growing mis-
trust by powerful member states, a tightening of budgets and inflexibilities
in decision-making (cf. Rittberger and Zangl, 2006).
3. Since the later 1990s, however, IGOs – in particular the World Bank – as
well as OECD governments have been giving higher priority to strategies
to fight poverty and to improve health in poor countries and are increas-
ingly reacting favourably to human-rights based policy approaches (see
for example the focus on equity and the references to human rights in the
World Development Report 2006). This can be explained by the increas-
ing power of advocacy-oriented Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)
(O’Brien et al., 2000), but also by the increasing perception of poverty and
health problems as threats to security (see e.g. Barnett, 2006; Ostergard,
2002; Peterson, 2002; Prins, 2004; Wolfensohn, 2004).
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4. In the last 20–5 years, institutional changes in international politics have
generated a multi-actor constellation and a developing system of global
governance (cf. Held and McGrew, 2002; Koenig-Archibugi and Zürn,
2006; Rosenau, 1997; Wilkinson, 2005). This multi-actor constellation is
particularly pronounced in global health governance (GHG) (cf. Hein 
et al., 2007). This is a field where deep-reaching institutional changes 
can be observed that reflect new challenges of globalization, but also an
increasing global interdependence due to a densification of social interac-
tions in an emerging global society.1
In this article we will look at the rise of GHG, concentrating on the rise of
new institutional structures in the field of HIV/AIDS, but also looking at the
wider impact of these developments on the realization of the right to health.
In the first section, we present the basic articles of human rights documents
related to global health. This is followed by a summary of the new challenges
posed to global health by globalization and by the new institutional develop-
ments in GHG in section two. We demonstrate this institutional setting more
closely by focusing on the problem of access to medication in the context of
HIV/AIDS. In the following sections, three to five, we look at the central
problems with which global social policies are confronted: the issue of defend-
ing social goals in the face of global trade rules aimed at the creation of global
markets, particularly with the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) (section three), as well as the issue of mobilizing
resources to finance health care in poor countries, i.e. issues of redistribution.
Section four analyses Global Public–Private Partnerships (GPPPs) as initia-
tives that give the pharmaceutical industry an opportunity to express corpo-
rate responsibility, and section five discusses the role of various types of 
actors in the broader perspective of mobilizing funds for the fight against
HIV/AIDS. Finally, section six concludes that GHG has developed as a
‘patchwork of compromises’.
1. Globalization, Social Rights and Health
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states
that all ‘States Parties recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ (Art. 12.1), which
includes ‘the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occu-
pational and other diseases’ as well as ‘the creation of conditions which would
assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness’
(Art. 12.2) (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm). These docu-
ments, however, are rather inconclusive with respect to the ‘standard of
health’ that is supposed to be ‘attainable’. The Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which was established to carry out the
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monitoring functions assigned to the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) in the Covenant, also publishes interpretations of its
provisions in the form of general comments. These can be seen as ‘more or
less authoritative statements of interpretation’ (Steiner and Alston, 2000:
265). In 2000, the CESCR adopted a 20-page document on ‘The right to the
highest attainable standard of health’,2 stating that:
If resource constraints render it impossible for a State to comply fully with its
Covenant obligations, it has the burden of justifying that every effort has nevertheless
been made to use all available resources at its disposal in order to satisfy, as a matter of
priority, the obligations outlined above. It should be stressed, however, that a State
party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the
core obligations set out in paragraph 43 above, which are non-derogable. (§ 47)
Now, § 43 confirms that State parties have an obligation ‘ … to provide essential
drugs, as from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on
Essential Drugs’ and ‘to ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods
and services’. As drugs for an anti-retroviral therapy are on the World Health
Organization (WHO) Essential Drugs List, states are formally obliged to provide
this therapy to HIV/AIDS patients, but many sub-Saharan African states (with
per capita public annual health expenditures of between US$5 and US$20)3 are
certainly not in a position to fulfil such an obligation. States, however, also have
the obligation to assist other states in fully realizing the right to health:
States parties should ensure that the right to health is given due attention in inter-
national agreements and, to that end, should consider the development of further
legal instruments. In relation to the conclusion of other international agreements,
States parties should take steps to ensure that these instruments do not adversely
impact upon the right to health. Similarly, States parties have an obligation to
ensure that their actions as members of international organisations take due
account of the right to health. (§ 39)
And, finally, § 64 reads:
Moreover, coordinated efforts for the realisation of the right to health should be
maintained to enhance the interaction among all the actors concerned, including
the various components of civil society. In conformity with articles 22 and 23 of the
Covenant, WHO, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations
Development Programme, UNICEF, the United Nations Population Fund, the
World Bank, regional development banks, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Trade Organization, and other relevant bodies within the United Nations
system, should cooperate effectively with States parties, building on their respec-
tive expertise, in relation to the implementation of the right to health at the
national level, with due respect to their individual mandates.
The ‘right to health’ is codified in slightly different formulations in a number of
other international agreements.4 As such, it constitutes binding international
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law, but it is widely seen as a typical example of ‘soft law’, which corresponds to
principles of basic human rights but is certainly also far from being an obliga-
tion enforceable by any institutionalized processes.
Indeed, it is difficult to develop a comprehensive concept on how the ‘right
to health’ should be universally implemented. What we argue is that (1) states
have an obligation to assist other states in fully realizing the right to health and
to ensure as members of IGOs that those states ‘take due account for the right
to health’ and, (2) international human rights law explicitly includes access to
essential medicines into the core obligations of every state. Though ‘access to
essential medicines’ only constitutes one aspect of the ‘right to health’, it nev-
ertheless constitutes one issue by which to test the international community’s
readiness to implement social human rights. In fact, it is interesting to examine
the extent to which pressure by civil society can substitute for the lack of 
material sanctions available to support the implementation of human rights.
In the following we examine the realization of these commitments in the con-
text of globalization and in particular, in relation to access to HIV/AIDS drugs.
2. Globalization, Actors in Health Politics and Governance
The huge gap between the need for achieving a significant improvement of
global health from a global rights as well as a global public goods perspective
and the results attained within the system of international governmental insti-
tutions as it has developed after the Second World War, is certainly one of the
factors that has led to the development of a new institutional structure in the
Global Governance of Health. The reference to an increasingly complex struc-
ture of different types of actors in global health is commonplace (Dodgson 
et al., 2002; Hein and Kohlmorgen, 2003; Kickbusch, 2003; Lee et al., 2002).
Political globalization can be seen as an expression of a new configuration of
actors, summarized by the term ‘governance’. Governance includes regulation
by state (nation states, intergovernmental organizations), by private regulation
(private sector and civil society) and forms of hybrid regulation (cooperation
between states/IGOs, private sector and/or civil society). Modifying a definition
by Renate Mayntz (2005), we can speak of GHG as the totality of collective reg-
ulations to deal with international and transnational interdependence in the
context of health issues (Bartsch and Kohlmorgen, 2005).
While the increased importance of non-state actors is a general character-
istic of politics in the era of globalization, non-state actors, in many regards,
play a more important role in the health sector than in other sectors. It can be
claimed that there is hardly any other field of global politics where new insti-
tutional forms have gained comparable significance as in global public health –
particularly in relation to financing, as in the case of the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and of the role of foundations in the financ-
ing of many of the Global Public–Private Partnerships in Health. One general
84 Global Social Policy 8(1)
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reason for this can be seen in the historical tradition of non-state actors’
involvement in health affairs (Loughlin and Berridge, 2002). Moreover, the role
of new actors and institutions refers to the political weight of global civil soci-
ety, which has become particularly present in the conflicts around the TRIPS
agreement and the access to treatment for millions of HIV/AIDS patients.
Human Rights organizations (CIEL, 3 D, Amnesty International), the Third
World Network, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), and CP-Tech (now part of
Knowledge Ecology International) as a crucial and comprehensive dissemina-
tor of information in all aspects related to intellectual property rights in
health have played a crucial role in these conflicts (see also Ford, 2004). CSOs
also were quite influential in shaping the outcome of the WHO-sponsored
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in Health
(CIPIH). The publication of the first alternative world health report (Global
Health Watch, 2006) has created another venue of CSO influence. Another
aspect has been the more recent particular prominence of non-traditional
mechanisms to generate resources for ends otherwise obviously under-
financed: the development of an entire system of GPPPs and the mounting
role of private foundations (in particular the Gates Foundation) and philan-
thropy in general are examples of such mechanisms where global health plays
an important role (Kaul, 2006: 222; Micklewright and Wright, 2003: 15–16).
In the following, we give a brief overview of the constellation of actors of
GHG and introduce the main actors in terms of their changing roles in sup-
porting global health.
The WHO was founded by the members of the international community
‘for the purpose of co-operation among themselves and with others to pro-
mote and protect the health of all peoples’ (WHO Constitution). Therefore,
it is the organization of nation states to promote global health, and the dele-
gates of member states decide on the organization’s strategies and policies in
the World Health Assembly. The WHO constitution declares that ‘the enjoy-
ment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental
rights of every human being’. ‘Health for All’ is not only the aim of WHO as
an organization but it is also established as the central objective of interna-
tional and national health activities by the nation states throughout the world.
The International Conference on Primary Health Care in Alma Ata in 1978
proposed and the World Health Assembly in 1979 endorsed Primary Health
Care as a strategy to achieve the objective of ‘Health for All by the Year 2000’,
not just by giving the poor a minimum of health services (in a more liberal
sense), but by providing health services for all as the foundation of a compre-
hensive health system (in a more universalistic sense).
The main responsibility for fulfilling this obligation lies with national gov-
ernments, yet the IGOs and the world community are also committed to
achieving a level of health for all people ‘that will permit them to lead a
socially and economically productive life’ by the year 2000 (Declaration of
Alma Ata 1978, WHO 1978). As we know, by 2000, the objective of ‘Health
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for All’ was not attained, and the likelihood of attaining it in the near future
remains rather slim. Nevertheless, in 1998, WHO (to be precise: the World
Health Assembly) renewed this objective under the label of ‘Health for All in
the 21st Century’. This statement also proclaims that the availability of essen-
tials of Primary Health Care should be ensured (Cueto, 2004; Thomas and
Weber, 2004: 192ff.). Still, WHO had been severely hampered by a lack of
internal flexibility to react to the new challenges of globalization and neolib-
eralism and a freeze of contributions to its budgets (Brown et al., 2006;
Kohlmorgen, 2007; Lee, 2004; Yamey, 2002).
Although WHO should be the central organization of global health, the
World Bank is the greatest single donor in health and one of the greatest 
single donors in the fight against HIV/AIDS, competing with WHO on 
conceptual issues of global health politics. The Bank can be characterized as
an actor that chiefly aims at economic development (and thus only indirectly
at the realization of global social rights). Besides health and HIV/AIDS pro-
grammes and loans, the Bank had (and still has) a great indirect impact on
health policies due to the conditionality of structural adjustment policies that
have now become poverty reduction strategies (Breman and Shelton, 2001).
The 1993 World Development Report ‘Investing in Health’ had an impor-
tant conceptual influence on health system reforms in the 1990s: by recom-
mending a public–private mix for financing the organization of health systems
and insisting on contributions of patients to the cost of services, the Bank tried
to link an expansion of social services to neoliberal economic concepts. Pushing
new concepts on health systems with its extended lending activities in the back-
ground has made the bank a powerful player in the centre of GHG (Abasi, 1999;
Buse and Gwin, 1998: 666; Lee et al., 1996; Thomas and Weber, 2004: 194).
As mentioned earlier, civil society organizations have for a long time played
an important role in providing health care, in quite different forms – from
religious orders to charity organizations. Foundations and professional
organizations have been an important part of international health politics.
During the 1990s, however, NGOs started to take a much more prominent
position. CSOs combined the contestation of liberalization and the protests
against increasing global inequality and a neglect of public responsibility in
global social policies (to a large extent attributed to the Bretton Woods
Institutions and WTO, see Khagram et al., 2002; O’Brien et al., 2000) with a
high level of practical competence. Especially, some of the larger CSOs like
Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières greatly increased their political weight
in the fight for social rights interests in general and in the field of global health
in particular (as expressed for example by awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize
to MSF in 1999). They gained political influence, primarily in the discursive
field (see Hein et al. 2007; Lee, 2003: 180–1; Zwi et al., 2002). While CSOs
have been demanding more social justice in general, they succeeded in mobi-
lizing support for specific issues such as access to medicines in the field of neg-
lected diseases and HIV/AIDS. This again coincided with a turn of some large
86 Global Social Policy 8(1)
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countries towards fighting specific diseases in which those actors saw the main
threat to their own populations and politics.5
Moreover, pharmaceutical companies did their part in moving the focus of
global health towards fighting specific diseases. They pursued their interests to
maximize profits and to sustain and even to extend intellectual property rights
as the main basis of refinancing their research and development (R & D) costs.
This created conflicts about the access of the poor to medicines against diseases
by which they were most severely hit. Transnational pharmaceutical companies
(TNPCs) tried to win support for their position by demonstrating corporate
responsibility and becoming increasingly involved in partnerships aimed at
improving the health situation of poor people basically through disease-specific
activities (drug research, improving access) (see section four).
Finally, large foundations, particularly the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation – due to their extensive resource-based power – entered the field
with philanthropic aims. According to the Gates Foundation website, their total
grant payments reached US$1.56bn in 2006 (more than half of that in global
health) and targets US$3.5bn from 2009 onwards. Thus, the Gates Foundation
has become one of the major funders for the promotion of global health.6
A certain decrease in the relative power of IGOs does not imply a similar
decrease in the power of national governments, which in their aim to pursue
their specific interests are trying to make use of the new constellations of global
governance. This includes governments from developing countries allying
themselves with CSOs as well as those from industrialized countries that again
engage more forcefully in global health issues not only to pursue social or
human rights interests but also self-interests like containing the risks of a global
spread of infectious diseases and of political instability. In fact, the self-interest
of rich countries may be one of the most important driving forces behind GHG.
Thus, the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was
established in 2002 with intense collaboration of the G8 countries and can be
interpreted as a result of the mixture of these different interests. The Global
Fund is a new form of hybrid regulation that seems characteristic for current
structures of GHG. It is often regarded as a GPPP, which in a sense is true,
but the fact that almost 96% of its funds are pledged by governments of nation
states shows that it differs from ‘typical’ GPPPs (Bartsch, 2007; Bartsch and
Hein, 2003). The Global Fund, currently the greatest single funding organi-
zation in the fight against HIV/AIDS, can be more precisely characterized as
a multilateral funding mechanism that works like a partnership. It has a new
and – compared with IGOs – unconventional governance structure: nation
states (eight from the North, seven from the South), CSOs (three), founda-
tions (one) and companies (one) are voting members of the Executive Board.
WHO, World Bank and UNAIDS are only non-voting members. Recipient
countries have to create a Country Coordinating Mechanism with the par-
ticipation of all stakeholders (including civil society and private sector) that is
authorized to apply for funds to conduct programmes.
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In 1995, the UN organizations involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS reacted
towards the increasing perception of the pandemic as a threat to global health and
social development with the establishment of the Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), as a new form of cooperative organization
within the UN system. The main objectives of UNAIDS are to coordinate UN
activities and to advocate a global reaction towards HIV/AIDS. Ten UN organi-
zations and programmes are co-sponsors of UNAIDS, among them the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), WHO, the World Bank, the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labour
Organisation (ILO). Delegates of CSOs and of groups of people living with
HIV/AIDS are non-voting members of the Programme Coordinating Board, the
most important decision-making body of UNAIDS. UNAIDS, however, did not
succeed in regaining the initiative in the fight against the disease (Kohlmorgen,
2007).
The focus of many of the new actors in GHG in fact seems to reflect the
increased strength of health-related issues in global politics. However, they
also reflect a change in focus of global health politics from primary health care
to fighting diseases. ‘Health for all’ frequently appears to be equivalent to
‘fighting the diseases of the poor’. Though this is certainly a questionable ten-
dency, it appears to be closely related to two other very salient problems,
which define necessary, though not sufficient, conditions to realize the uni-
versal right to health and which we will discuss in the following sections: 
(1) the access to medicines under the conditions of the internationalization of
intellectual property rights through TRIPS and (2) the mobilization of
resources, which appears to be easier when the concerns are concrete, easy-
to-understand scandals and not seemingly insurmountable barriers, such as
bad living conditions and poverty in large parts of the South.
3. TRIPS, Global Civil Society and Social Rights
In the second half of the 1990s, drugs were available (and widely used in indus-
trialized countries) that transformed HIV/AIDS into a chronic disease. A com-
bination therapy consisting of three different anti-retroviral drugs allowed most
AIDS patients to lead a relatively normal life – provided they did not develop
resistances or strong side effects against these drugs and they (or their health
insurance or national health system) were ready to pay about US$10,400 per
year for the drugs alone (MSF, 2005: 10). These expenses were not due to the
production costs of the drugs but due to the exploitation of patent rights by
pharmaceutical companies now internationalized due to TRIPS. Meanwhile, in
certain countries, companies could (legally) produce the same drugs as generics
for a fraction of these costs.7 For the first time we encountered a situation where
effective forms of treatment were now available for a disease that had been at
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the centre of global attention for some time. These effective forms of treatment
were available in general but not accessible for the majority of people in need of
them due to a lack of resources or extremely high prices. The moral argument
for allowing poor people access to medication as well as the political importance
of fighting the HIV/AIDS pandemic in poor regions could not be denied. The
fact that some countries – like India – could offer cheaper drugs due to specific
circumstances made the situation even more untenable.
The WTO’s objective is to regulate and facilitate world trade, it is not a
welfare-oriented (or multipurpose) organization. Nevertheless, free trade has
always been promoted with the promise that it will create a win-win situation
for all participants. Thus, in a number of ways, it is normatively related to
global welfare: the WTO is based on the general assumption that expanding
trade has a generally positive impact on welfare. The preamble to the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization includes goals sup-
porting ‘development’ and improving standards of living.8 In addition, safe-
guard mechanisms can be used in situations of social crisis, and specific WTO
committees deal with welfare-related problems. We find more concrete 
references to public health in Art. 8,1 of the TRIPS agreement:
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt meas-
ures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.
Similar references can be found in various other agreements.9 Certainly, the
interpretation of these references is limited by the general aims of the agree-
ments of which they form a part (i.e. liberalization of international economic
relations), but they constitute normative points of reference that can serve as
a starting point for interpreting and readjusting provisions of the agreements –
depending, of course, on relations of interests and power in global politics.
The defence of agricultural protectionism in the context of WTO is proof of
the central role of power relations in the concrete working of the agreements.
The conflicts on the interpretation and amendment of TRIPS between 1997
and 2005 are a further demonstration of these power relations.
These conflicts have been analysed in detail by various authors.10 They
played an important role in a research project on GHG, in which the authors
participated and carried out 36 interviews with representatives of interna-
tional organizations and CSOs in Geneva – here we refer to the most impor-
tant steps of this process.
First, in the late 1990s there were conflicts about the interpretation of
TRIPS between the Brazilian and South African governments on the one side
and TNPCs and the US government on the other. Both countries were not as
fortunate as India: India’s patent law of 1970 (enacted in 1972) did not pro-
vide product patent protection and – according to Art. 65.4 – TRIPS allowed
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it ten years to adjust the law to TRIPS rules (see also Chaudhuri, 2005: 63).
Brazil and South Africa had to make their patent laws compatible with TRIPS
by 2000 and did so by 1997. Brazil basically tried to put pressure on pharma-
ceutical companies to reach better terms of access to antiretrovivals (ARVs)
and to reduce the prices of drugs in Brazil in order to finance the national
programme for ARV treatment to all those in need (Wade, 2003: 5ff.; Wogart
and Calcagnotto, 2006). In South Africa, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’
Association, backed by 39 Pharma TNCs, filed a lawsuit against the South
African Government in 1997, which in that year had authorized the health
department to determine the conditions under which parallel imports to
lower the costs of AIDS treatment should be permitted (Medicines and
Related Substances Control Amendment Act). The lawsuit was first dropped
in late 1998, then reinstated in January 2001 and finally withdrawn in April
2001, as it proved to be detrimental to the image of the pharmaceutical indus-
try (see Kühl, 2002; Lanoszka, 2003; Weissman, 2001).
Second, with pressure by the African Group in WTO and support by docu-
ments accepted shortly before by WHO and the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Correa, 2002), the so-called Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was adopted during
the 4th Ministerial Conference of WTO at Doha in November 2001, stating:
… that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a man-
ner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular,
to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the right of
WTO members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which
provide flexibility for this purpose (§ 4, referring to the possible use of compulsory
licenses and parallel importing).
Third, § 6 of the Doha Declaration stipulated further negotiations on the
conditions of compulsory licenses for the supply from third party countries, as
compulsory licensing was authorized basically for local consumption, posing a
problem for countries having no industry to produce generic versions of needed
drugs. Again, after one and a half years of negotiations, the industry (basically
represented by US negotiators) had to accept the authorization of compulsory
licensing for import irrespective of the disease involved.11 On the other hand, devel-
oping countries had to accept what they see as burdensome requirements: the
obligation of producers to mark these products by a specific shape, colour or
packaging and the requirement of notification on the lack of local technologi-
cal capacities. Later we will take up this argument again.
Fourth, the TRIPS Amendment (§ 31 f and h) of December 2005 finally
took over the § 6 decision; CSOs and developing countries did not succeed in
reducing requirements for compulsory licensing, like the requirements
referred to above and the Chairpersons’ statement, which lists the countries
that have opted out of using the system as importers (WTO General Council,
WT/GC/M/82, 13 November 2003). Thus, after the 2005 amendment many
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NGOs might uphold their critique that the § 6 decision is really ‘unworkable’
(Abbott, 2005: 317), but on the other hand, studies show that the use of
TRIPS flexibilities as confirmed in this process might in fact help to ensure a
sustainable supply of essential medicines in sub-Saharan African countries
(Avafia et al., 2006).
The (intermediate) result of the conflict led to a situation where the posi-
tion of the WTO Secretariat approached that of civil society groups often
seen as ‘globalization critics’, while the pharmaceutical industry only grudg-
ingly accepted the results. At the same time TNPCs turned to other paths to
realize their aims, like bilateral trade agreements. Particularly since the
Brazilian HIV/AIDS programme received international praise for its success
in providing general treatment and in order to pressure TNPCs to offer drugs
at affordable prices, public opinion had become mobilized against politics of
intellectual property rights that guaranteed profits to TNCs while effectively
denying treatment to those in need. Obviously, at least under strong observa-
tion by the media, political leaders might be effectively put under pressure not
to concede a limitation of TRIPS flexibilities because of the interests of pri-
vate economic actors (see Abbott, 2005: 356).
Brazil and South Africa played a crucial role in mobilizing a global public to
take seriously the welfare-related clauses in the TRIPS Agreement (as expressed
in Articles 7 and 8). This success, however, depended on the active role of a
global civil society, taking up these demands and channelling them into pressure
on rich country governments. The strength of CSOs in GHG can be seen as a
result of a twofold strategy of both protesting/lobbying and providing knowl-
edge/cooperation. While CSOs organized pressure on Northern states by
essentially influencing public opinion, they also more or less directly influenced
and coordinated the political positions of smaller Southern nation states, which
otherwise would have hardly had any impact on WTO negotiations. CSOs
worked as advisors to developing country members of WTO and thus empow-
ered poor developing countries to take a strong position in the negotiations on
§ 6. In doing so, CSOs assumed an important role as ‘midwives’ for the devel-
opment of formal global politics.12
However limited, the Doha Declaration and the § 6 negotiations demonstrate
that – at least under certain conditions – it is possible to convert the safeguards and
general clauses included in the WTO agreements into concrete compromises to
deal with situations of obvious injustice. Certainly, this must be seen as part of a
process of global socialization: a market-based global economic integration is only
sustainable if it is supplemented by institutional developments that can deal with
the social inequalities and conflicts, i.e. if it permits the articulation between tra-
ditional and new social actors in new processes of shaping global rules and find-
ing compromises to solve conflicts. Though critics of the § 6 solution point to the
fact this mechanism has not been used by countries concerned, there can be no
doubt that the negotiating position of these countries has been strengthened.13
Thailand issued a compulsory licence for ARVs produced by Abbott, Merck and
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Sanofi-Aventis in January and February 2007 and Brazil took a similar step in May
2007. They did not need to use the proposed solution. It thus remains to be seen
whether this mechanism will work to ease access to medication in the case of other
diseases or in the case of new generations of AIDS medicines. The Indian patent
law introduced in 2005 will not prohibit the ongoing generic production of first-
line ARVs (Abbott, 2006: 6; Chaudhuri, 2005: 65–70). For patients who need
second-line ARVs because of resistance and medical incompatibilities, the only
relatively low-priced drug (lopinavir/ritonavir from Abbott Laboratories) is avail-
able only in least developed countries at the reduced price of US$550, while it is
sold in low middle-income countries like El Salvador and Peru for between
US$4468 and US$4511 (Vasan et al., 2006: 395). Moreover, there is an urgent
need for cheap drugs specifically suitable for the treatment of children. According
to MSF, a treatment with the usual triple combination in a paediatric formulation
for a child weighing 10 kg can cost US$816, while treating an adult costs only
US$182 (MSF, 2005: 4ff.). Thus, issues for new conflicts lie ahead.
4. Pharma TNCs and GPPPs: Accepting the Right to Health
and Defending Corporate Interests
Intellectual property rights are the most important basis for recovering the
capital invested by pharmaceutical companies in R & D. A widely quoted esti-
mate of US$802m for the development costs of a new medicine is based on a
US research project.14 The appropriateness of assumptions made in this proj-
ect have been questioned and there seems ground to assume that in many cases
costs are considerably lower. The TB Alliance for example arrived at estimates
between US$115m and US$240m for each tuberculosis drug (CIPIH/WHO,
2006: 75–6). However, in comparison to many other industries, there is little
doubt about the dimension of costs and risks involved. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that the industry is strongly opposed to any form of weakening the
patent system even if they might concede that this system has its flaws – and
that they are fiercely lobbying governments, in particular the US government,
to support TRIPS and the Intellectual Property Right (IPR) system (see for
example Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 58–87).
Bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have been used by the US govern-
ment to incorporate clauses that forced trade partners to exclude the possibil-
ity of using the flexibilities included in TRIPS. Most partners agreed to these
demands as their priorities were oriented towards getting access to the US
markets for their export industries.15 Frederick Abbott writes of a TRIPS II
agenda of ‘strong mercantile interests’16 seeking to increase technology and
‘expression rents’17 in reaction to the change of conditions following the nego-
tiation of the TRIPS Agreement in the course of the Uruguay Round (Abbott,
2006). These problems had been discussed at length with regard to different
US trade agreements with Latin American countries and Thailand.18
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On the other hand, the more the right to health is becoming a central polit-
ical and moral issue, the more the industry is coming under pressure to live up
to its corporate responsibility and contribute to the struggle for a ‘better health
for all’. In fact, from their perspective, nothing appears better suited than a
strategy of GPPPs.19 In the first instance, GPPPs evolved since the end of the
1980s as a result of the problems faced in developing new medicines and vac-
cines for the typical diseases of the poor and marginalized parts of the global
population, which had been neglected because there were no opportunities for
TNPCs to recover drug development costs on the market. Through the coop-
eration between relevant actors, usually IGOs (frequently WHO), pharma-
ceutical companies and occasionally private sponsors, costs and risks in R & D
are shared and the access of poor people to the new drugs is guaranteed.20
Another type of GPPP concentrates on easing access to drugs that are
already on the market, such as the Mectizan Donation Programme (medicine
against river blindness and elephantiasis) (Frost and Reich, 1998). The most
important programme in the case of HIV/AIDS is the Accelerating Access
Initiative (AAI, cf. Sturchio, 2004). This is a GPPP involving five UN agencies
(UNAIDS, WHO, World Bank, UNICEF und UNFPA) and seven pharma-
ceutical companies (Abbott Laboratories, Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol-
Myers Squibb, GSK, Gilead Sciences, Merck Co. and Hoffmann-LaRoche),
working together with national governments in providing access to HIV-treatment.
An International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations
(IFPMA) document published in January 2005 highlighted that by September
2004, 330,000 patients were treated with ARVs supplied by AAI companies, i.e.
about half of all patients in developing countries receiving treatment at that
time (IFPMA, 2005).
Many of the GPPPs have been criticized by civil society actors and often by
public health specialists as well for linking humanitarian actions to specific
interests of the firms involved such as generating PR material and not offering
reliable and transparent solutions to the problem of access and medical service
(Buse and Lee, 2005; Buse and Walt, 2002; Health Action International, 2001;
Richter, 2003, 2004). On the other hand, there is no doubt that the rise of
GPPPs reflects the acceptance that pharmaceutical R & D and the access to
patented drugs are a public issue that needs to be negotiated. The role of
GPPPs fits into the general picture of an increasing complexity of GHG:
though it is difficult to assess ‘how these initiatives affect the health and the
conditions of those they are meant to help’ (Health Action International,
2001), they have constituted another field of activity characterized by a broad
involvement of various types of actors in GHG thus strengthening the general
acceptance of a universal right to health.
Other instruments that are accepted by the pharmaceutical industry are dif-
ferential pricing,21 and so-called Advance Purchase Schemes, i.e. public assur-
ances (and prepayments) to purchase medicines on which research is done,
providing inventors with some guarantee regarding the income they can expect.
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5. Mobilization of Resources for Fighting HIV/AIDS: Old and
New Actors in Global Health Governance
The availability of generic ARVs offered mainly by Indian producers, negoti-
ations of the Clinton Foundation, the World Bank, UNICEF and the Global
Fund with these generic producers in India for special prices in bulk pur-
chases, the improved negotiating position of developing countries due to the
Doha Declaration and the TRIPS Amendments and, finally, concessions by
TNPCs themselves have led to a dramatic fall of ARV prices in developing
countries. Since the late 1990s they fell from well over US$10,000 to about
US$140 (for generics, per person/year, in some countries) in 2005 (MSF,
2005: 10). Hence we now have a situation in which the transfer of interna-
tional resources in many poor countries could at least open a window for start-
ing treatment programmes on a larger scale. Indeed, according to UNAIDS,
from 1996 to 2005 the money spent on the global fight against HIV/AIDS in
low- and middle-income countries increased from US$300m to US$8.3bn
altogether (including national and international funding). However, as raising
US$140 per year is still a problem for many AIDS victims in poor countries
and a proper health system is indispensable for the functioning of AIDS treat-
ment, more funding is necessary. UNAIDS states that there is an increasing
funding gap to reverse the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. For 2007, for exam-
ple, about US$18bn is needed, but only US$10bn is expected to be available
(UNAIDS, 2006: 224–5).
Will the new institutional setting in GHG also help to mobilize sufficient
resources to implement at least the social rights to treatment in the case of
people living with HIV/AIDS? A brief look at the funding of global health
activities shows that state actors are still at the centre of governance struc-
tures. ‘New’ institutional modes of governance and ‘new’ actors are only to
a limited degree the source of increased funding, even if their pressure might
play an important role to mobilize these resources. In 2005, governments of
the OECD/DAC (Development Assistance Committee) countries provided
US$5.1bn for HIV/AIDS (through bilateral and multilateral commitments).
Domestic sources within low- and middle-income countries amounted to
US$2.8bn, and private sources contributed only about US$0.4bn (UNAIDS,
2006: 231ff.). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in 2005 G8/EU govern-
ments disbursed – despite the existence of the Global Fund – US$3.5bn
through bilateral programmes, whereas only about US$0.81bn were allo-
cated via the Global Fund (Kates and Lief, 2006: 9). Thus, the G8 countries
are the major players in terms of funding and – as providing resources gen-
erally translates into influence and power – also in terms of policies and
strategies of GHG. Since the G7/G8 summit in Okinawa in 2000, the G8
addressed infectious diseases, and particularly HIV/AIDS, as a major prob-
lem to human security and included the fight against HIV/AIDS in poverty
reduction strategies.
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Despite all bilateral activities, the G8 countries together with Kofi Annan
initiated the Global Fund. The Global Fund has attracted pledges of
US$9.5bn until 2008 and approved US$5.6bn to support programmes in 132
countries thus far (September 2006).22 Of the money donated, 94.4% is pro-
vided by OECD members, 1.1% by non-OECD countries. A closer look at the
4.5% private and civil society donations shows that the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation – generally one of the largest funders of global health activities –
alone is responsible for 97% of all non-state donations. Corporations 
contributed only 0.06% of all donations.23 Thus, the Global Fund hardly gen-
erates any financial resources from new and unconventional sources.
The Global Fund was launched as a finance mechanism separate from the
UN system because the USA, in particular, but also Japan and Italy did not want
to have it under the auspices of the UN. This, of course, led to controversial dis-
cussions, because UN organizations, and especially WHO, feared a loss of
influence on global health issues and some health experts and CSOs were afraid
of a privatization of governance.24 This separate construction of the Global
Fund is an interesting point when considering the interests and strategies of
powerful nation states: nation states (in this case mainly the USA) use hybrid
regulation (the Global Fund) to circumvent formally legitimized IGOs (WHO
and World Bank) in allocating money to fulfil a global public task. This means
that hybrid regulation and networks, which lead to a sharing of the states’ power
and influence with other actors, are a result of interests of nations states. Yet at
the same time, the partnership structure of the Fund involves actors fighting for
social rights, like CSOs and also organizations of people living with HIV/AIDS,
and facilitates a bottom-up approach in the process of fund application, which
empowers actors at the national and local level. Including actors that have long
been involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria as well as
experts, while trying to prevent group-oriented (industrialized vs. developing
countries) political alignments makes sense in principle – whether it will solve
problems more effectively is another question.
As a funding agency, the Global Fund competes with the World Bank,
which, as already mentioned, is the greatest single donor in health and one of
the greatest single donors in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Since 2000, the
World Bank runs the Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP). Together,
26 African countries have received more than US$1bn so far.25 Although the
US government has considerable influence on the Bank’s policies and strate-
gies and although it played an important role in the establishment of the
Global Fund, it launched the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) as a bilateral programme (or better: a global unilateral programme) in
2004. PEPFAR will provide US$15bn to fight HIV/AIDS until 2009 (US$9bn
for new bilateral programmes in 14 African and Caribbean countries, US$5bn
for existing programmes in 75 countries and US$1bn for the Global Fund). It
is implemented mainly by USAID, but with substantial involvement of 
some US-based CSOs and certain CSOs from the recipient countries, mainly
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faith-based organizations (Bartsch and Kohlmorgen, 2007). PEPFAR propa-
gates the ABC method of AIDS prevention: abstinence, being faithful in part-
ner relationships and using condoms, with the emphasis on ‘A’ and ‘B’, with ‘C’
only as a last solution or for risk-groups (such as prostitutes). Besides preven-
tion, PEPFAR also focuses on treatment. After CSOs accused the Office of the
US Global AIDS Coordinator (which until 2006 was led by Randall L. Tobias,
a former CEO of the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly & Co.) of only financ-
ing branded drugs, PEPFAR now also utilizes generic drugs in its programmes
(in 2006: 27% of total procurement of ARVs; see Office of the US Global
AIDS Coordinator, 2007: 70).
The fact that PEPFAR is primarily a bilateral programme and does not allo-
cate greater financial resources to multilateral funds indicates that the US gov-
ernment preferred to develop a programme that it could control according to
national interests, while at the same time attaching a great deal of importance
to the fight against HIV/AIDS. Due to a general scepticism towards multilat-
eralism and due to specific interests of social groups in the USA, the activities
of WHO, UNAIDS and also the Global Fund are increasingly circumvented.
We can identify – besides the general attitude of unilateralism – a rather
strange mixture of interests affecting the way the US government conducts
PEPFAR, such as interests of pharmaceutical companies, Christian beliefs and
conservative opinions. The general impetus to fund the fight against
HIV/AIDS may arise from interests in presenting the USA not only as a war-
faring nation but also as a soft power that assumes responsibility for global
problems like poverty and infectious diseases, but also has interests in the polit-
ical stability of focus countries, which partly have important strategic positions
in conflict-ridden regions and/or have natural resources (Burkhalter, 2004;
Ingram, 2005; Morrison, 2006). Although this concerns basically national self-
interests (or collective interests of rich countries), it can improve the likelihood
of realizing social rights in the countries concerned. PEPFAR, born out of
national interests, is a contribution to GHG and promotes the establishment
of global social rights.
Looking at WHO as an actor in GHG and taking into account the develop-
ment of additional forms of funding from many organizations, particularly
those from the global civil society that have become involved in global health
discourses, one can argue that WHO is, especially since the 1990s, a relatively
enervated actor of GHG, particularly in the fight against HIV/AIDS. This is
related to the aforementioned complicated decision-making processes that
have to aggregate the interests and commitments of member states and is
therefore linked to bureaucratic forms of organization. In addition, other fac-
tors weakened WHO’s position until the turn of the Millennium: incoherence
between voting-power (majority position of developing countries) and the
control of financial resources (resistance by, against many industrialized coun-
tries an increase of the ordinary WHO budget); limited resource-based power
of WHO not being a funding organization (primarily knowledge and advisory
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capacities) and, finally, competition by new actors in the field of GHG became
stronger. During the last years, however, WHO has used various new strate-
gies to regain the initiative in GHG.
Two of these strategies can be identified in the field of infectious diseases.
The first – under the aegis of Gro Harlem Brundtland – has been to enhance
PPPs (e.g. Stop TB and Roll Back Malaria are hosted by WHO). These
efforts can be interpreted as a reaction of WHO to the changed institutional
setting and as an attempt to regain the initiative in this institutional context,
which provides private actors with greater influence in politics. The second
strategic decision was the reintegration of the fight against HIV/AIDS into
WHO. After the establishment of UNAIDS in 1996, WHO transferred its
competencies, personnel and resources in this field to this new joint venture
of UN organizations. In spite of major problems in coordinating the UN
member organizations, UNAIDS can be seen as the leading UN organization
in the fight against HIV/AIDS as far as normative and strategic aspects are
concerned, that is until WHO started to develop its own HIV/AIDS policy
again in 2000–1. In 2003, WHO (together with UNAIDS) launched the 
so-called 3 by 5 Initiative, which aimed at providing 3m people suffering from
AIDS with ARV drugs until the end of 2005.
Consistent with our hypothesis about the essentially positive impact of the new
institutional configuration on the implementation of social rights, we can
observe that networks were crucial in the pursuit of the objectives of 3 by 5. Due
to its lack of funds, WHO could only increase its budget for more activities in
training health workers and developing health systems, but could not close the
estimated 3 by 5 funding gap of US$5.5bn. WHO cooperated with all the other
organizations and initiatives in the GHG field. However, with the 3 by 5 Initiative,
WHO tried to strengthen its own position and attempted to gain influence in the
global HIV/AIDS politics arena and in one of its most salient policy fields, AIDS
treatment. Though the goals of the initiative were not reached (only 1m patients
on ARV treatment by August 2006; WHO, 2006), WHO continued its strategy
on the same line with its target of ‘Universal Access by 2010’.
Finally, WHO tried successfully to strengthen its position by taking over a
role as an initiator of new discourses. This started with the Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health (CMH; 2000–2) and was carried on in 2004–6
with the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in
Public Health (CIPIH) and the work of the Commission on the Social
Determinants of Health since 2005. CIPIH together with the proposed reso-
lution on a Global Framework on Essential Health Research lead to the estab-
lishment of an Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health,
Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights.
This points to another political field in which WHO as an intergovern-
mental organization has asserted its role, the negotiations of international
agreements. The new International Health Regulations, which coordinate
restrictions on travel and the exchange of goods, cooperation in surveillance
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and research in international health emergencies (Fidler, 2005), and the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Collin et al., 2005) are gener-
ally seen as important achievements.
The activities in the fight against HIV/AIDS exemplify some of the contradic-
tions and inconsistencies of the institutional modes of global governance: on the
one hand, powerful nations shifted their activities to the Global Fund (to bypass
WHO), which implies a sharing of power with other actors, while on the other
hand, they pursued their own interests by conducting bilateral programmes such
as PEPFAR. Meanwhile, the Global Fund itself is sidestepped and has difficulties
in attracting enough funding. Although it is quite normal that donor countries
disburse most of their money via bilateral programmes – as this allows them best
to pursue their interests – it is striking that the US government, for example,
established PEPFAR after playing a crucial role in creating the Global Fund. This
can be characterized as forum shifting from a multilateral network, e.g. with at
least some aspects of a bottom-up approach, to a hierarchical state institution with
a top-down approach. However, both PEPFAR and the US contributions to the
Global Fund demonstrate that powerful and rich nation states are willing to make
compromises at the global level in order to tackle global problems. Nevertheless,
at the same time, nation states remain powerful actors and they can use the insti-
tutional context of these compromises, the partnerships and networks, to pursue
their interests. In spite of the games played by powerful actors in solving problems
through cooperation while trying to keep as much control as possible, the insti-
tutional and political compromises and the mixture of human rights interests and
national self-interests seem to increase the political efforts and financial resources
to tackle health problems in developing countries. This contributes, at least in one
field, to the realization of social rights at the global level.
6. Conclusion: Current Form of Global Heath Governance as a
Patchwork of Compromises
We started our analysis of conflicts on social rights in the field of global health
by explaining the commitments on social rights and especially on rights to
health made by the global community. Due to the hegemony of neoliberal con-
cepts in economic globalization during the 1980s and early 1990s, progress in
the realization of social rights was slow in most developing countries as prior-
ity was given to economic liberalization and political freedom. Since the mid-
1990s, insights have gained ground that poverty reduction and improvements
in health do not automatically result from liberalization and economic growth,
and that parts of the global economy are marginalized or even excluded from
trade and foreign investments (especially parts of Africa). Today, poverty
reduction and greater efforts to fight infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS are
among the top issues of the global political agenda to mitigate the biggest
social problems resulting from economic liberalization.
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At the same time, the globalization process has intensified the density of
social and political interactions on a global scale. We face an increasing global
awareness of conflicts and social problems. Richer countries realize that prob-
lems in marginalized regions are also to some extent their problems, as for
example in the case of infectious diseases or HIV/AIDS threatening the eco-
nomic and political stability in some countries and regions that might in turn
have international consequences. As the global risks of infectious diseases and
the importance of health to social and political stability are acknowledged,
health is increasingly perceived as a global public good that requires strength-
ened global efforts. Thus, the increasing global awareness of problems and
the global activities to tackle these issues are related to the self-interest of
well-to-do people in the North.
Moreover, the global political space has become increasingly important.
Due to a lack of adequate reactions of nation states and IGOs to these global
problems, civil society and private sector actors play a prominent role in the
evolving global governance – particularly in social and health policy affairs.
This has a twofold effect. On the one hand, corporations and business associ-
ations use this political space to pursue their interests and to foster market lib-
eralization that might undermine social rights. On the other hand, actors like
NGOs, advocacy groups and foundations that strengthen social rights have a
greater influence on politics – and are putting pressure on large enterprises to
assume corporate responsibility.
Of course, we are a far cry from implementing the whole body of social
rights laid down in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. Nevertheless, we can observe increasing efforts to realize
social rights in the field of health based on the moral power of advocacy and
the changing pattern of material interests in the course of the integration of
global society. The analysis has shown that the current forms and effects of
GHG are characterized by institutional and political compromises. The Doha
Declaration, and the § 6 decision in particular, can be seen as such a compro-
mise. In addition, the establishment of the Global Fund represents a political
and institutional compromise between actors pursuing material interests,
such as containing health risks and reaching social and political stability (gov-
ernments of industrialized countries) and securing profits (pharmaceutical
companies) on the one hand, and actors striving for social rights on the other.
Part of the current structure of compromises is the bypassing of the for-
mally legitimized UN organizations such as WHO. Powerful actors, i.e. gov-
ernments from nation states, use hybrid regulation and networks to achieve
their goals. However, at the same time, the engagement in networks means
being compelled to make compromises. WHO–at least formally the central
organization of GHG and the central global entity to provide and guarantee
social rights in the field of global health – is to some extent weakened due to
strategies of forum shifting of governments from the North. It has the struc-
tural problem of not being a funding organization. Its power is based on its
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legitimacy as a global organization representing member states, on knowledge
and the capacities to set norms.
The new institutional setting of GHG based on networks, partnerships and
increased private activities strengthens social rights to health for victims of dis-
eases: the basic right to live at all. However, it does not – at least at the moment –
aim at comprehensive social rights in the field of health, which would require
the improvement of general living conditions (access to healthy food, clean
water and sanitation) and well-developed health systems. Moreover, we can
maintain that the current primary focus of GHG on specific diseases is, in var-
ious aspects, contradictory to the realization of this basic social right for all, 
as it is only a selective strategy. It remains to be seen whether the current 
compromises can function as basis for future politics targeting social rights 
for all.
In our analysis we have observed the integration of a progressively complex
political field of GHG characterized by its relationship to soft and hard inter-
national law, institutional arenas of conflicts, channels of financial transfers and
manifold old and new actors linking this political field ever more closely to
increasingly dense global social structures. There is no reason to expect a har-
monious collaboration of these actors to promote rights to health, but there is
reason to expect that these rights (and that means, above all, the health of the
poor) are becoming a much more significant global political issue than it was
some decades ago. Drawing a conclusion from this particular issue for the
wider field of global social policy we can say that the evolving structures of
global governance have some potential to effect greater global social justice
and cohesion. However, this process is still in its infancy, and the level of social
rights improvement reached thus far is not stable as governance structures
remain fragile and fragmented.
notes
1. ‘Densification’ refers to the definition of globalization given in Held et al. (1999:
16): ‘a process … which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of
social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity,
velocity and impact – generating transcontinental of interregional flows and net-
works of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power’. These tendencies towards
an increased interconnectedness and interdependence or global social relations con-
stitutes a basis for talking about an evolving global society.
2. This document is part of a series of comments by the CESCR called ‘Substantive
issues arising in the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights’ adopted since 1989, here ‘General Comment No. 14’
(document E/C.12/2000/4), accessed 12 December 2007, http://www.bayelsty.
com/themes/health-general-general-comments.php.
3. cf. WHO website, accessed 25 April 2007, http://www.who.int/countries/en/
4. In addition to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
see the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (Articles 10, 12 and 14), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
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of Racial Discrimination (Art. 5) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(Art. 24). In addition, Art. 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union refers to the rights established by ‘national laws and practices’ and adds that:
‘A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and
implementation of all Union policies and activities.’ Furthermore, we find commit-
ments by governments to improve human health in a number of declarations and
Programmes of Action (Agenda 21, chapter 6, §§ 1 and 12; Cairo Programme of
Action, Principle 8 and § 8.6; Copenhagen Declaration, Commitment 6; Beijing
Declaration, §§ 17 and 30; Habitat Agenda §§ 36 and 128) and, of course, in the
Millennium Declaration.
5. For a more detailed analysis on the development of global civil society and its
relation to health, cf. Bartsch and Kohlmorgen (2007) as well as Hein (2007).
6. For the data see http://www.gatesfoundation.org/MediaCenter/FactSheet/ (grant
payments in 2006) and http://www.gatesfoundation.org/AboutUs/RelatedInfo/
Buffett.htm (2009 target), accessed 21 June 2007.
7. This was due to the provision of the TRIPS agreement that developing countries,
which had already enacted their own system of patent protection did not have to
adjust them to TRIPS rules until 2005, which was the case for India.
8. ‘The Parties to this Agreement, Recognizing that their relations in the field of
trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising stan-
dards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing vol-
ume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and
trade in goods and services’.
9. For example, cf. GATS, Art. 14 b; preambles of the Agreements on Agriculture
and on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
10. See for example the studies by Abbott (2005, 2006); Koivusalo (2003); Schultz and
Walker (2005); Sell (2002); Sell and Prakash (2002) ’t Hoen (2002); The authors’
interviews are analysed in more detail in Hein (2007: 59–61) and Kohlmorgen
(2007).
11. Finally, it has been agreed that it is up to the governments concerned to make use
of the system established in the decision (except for those countries that have
stated that they will use it only in a limited way or not at all).
12. In this context, the South Centre has played an important role in organizing com-
munication between health NGOs and Southern national delegates to the WTO
(interviews of the authors, see earlier).
13. Concerning the Thai CL on efavirenz (produced by Merck), in fact Merck now
offers the medicine at a price competitive with a generic version produced in India
if the CL would be revoked (ip-health, 4 June 2007). In mid-June 2007 there was
still no definite decision from the Thai government.
14. DiMasi et al. (2003) analysed the R & D costs for 68 randomly chosen drugs (of
course, on the basis of data provided by the pharmaceutical industry).
15. Agreements are in force or signed with Jordan, Singapore, Chile, the countries of
the Central American Free Trade Area, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, Peru
and Colombia, and negotiations are underway with the Southern African
Customs Union and Thailand (see Abbott, 2006: 8).
16. This concerns the copyright-dependent audio-visual industry and the pharma-
ceutical and agricultural chemical industry.
17. ‘Expression rents’: rents based on licenses.
18. There are a number of critical texts on Free Trade Agreements with TRIPS+ pro-
visions. The UNCTAD–ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development
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has presented a number of interesting studies on these negotiations (see
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/FTAs.htm, accessed 25 April 2007); Oxfam
produced various briefing notes and briefing papers on this subject (see Oxfam,
2002; see also Abbott, 2006; Vivas-Eugui, 2003).
19. Currently, there are about 80 GPPPs in the health sector (Bartsch, 2003; Buse and
Walt, 2002; Richter, 2004; Widdus, 2001).
20. Examples of such GPPPs are the Medicines for Malaria Venture, the Global
Alliance for TB Drug Development, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative
and the Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunization.
21. Though an EU initiative in 2002 to register pharmaceutical companies offering
price cuts of 80% or a price 10% above production costs for ARVs sold to least
developed and other low-income countries (The Pulse. Health and Pharma
Quarterly Check-up, Nov. 2002: 5–6) did not turn out particularly successful,
pharmaceutical companies quite extensively use this instrument to demonstrate
corporate responsibility (for example in the context of the Accelerating Access
Initiative; see IFPMA 2005).
22. Of these funds, 56% are provided for HIV/AIDS measures like prevention and
treatment.
23. For data see: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/files/pledges&contributions.xls
(accessed 1 May 2006).
24. Source: more than 60 interviews with experts and with staff members of WHO,
World Bank, UNAIDS and NGOs conducted for the research project ‘Global
Health Governance’ at the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
25. Participation of non-state actors at the country level and good governance are
prerequisites for recipient countries to receive money in the MAP. Thus,
although the MAP is a programme by an international organization, it empowers
non-state actors at the national level and relies on networking.
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résumé
La Gouvernance de la Santé Globale: Les Conflits à Propos des
Droits Sociaux Globaux
Ce papier analyse l’effet des nouvelles structures institutionnelles dans la gouvernance
de la santé globale sur la réalisation des droits sociaux dans les pays pauvres. Dans ce
document on considère l’exemple de la politique globale du SIDA/VIH. Le papier
soutient que des nouveaux modes de gouvernance augmentent la participation des
groupes de société civile et des communautés affectés, mais suggère qu’ils sont aussi
fréquemment instrumentalisés par des acteurs puissants qui cherchent à poursuivre
leurs propres intérêts. En fait, on mobilise d’autant plus de ressources dans la lutte
contre les maladies liées à la pauvreté. Le papier conclut que la gouvernance de la santé
globale est caractérisée par une combinaison de valeurs morales et d’intérêts matéri-
aux qui ne garantissent pas une réalisation compréhensive des droits sociaux – ce qui a
été suggéré par notre expérience dans la politique du SIDA/VIH, les conflits autour de
l’Accord ‘TRIPS’, et le développement des ‘GPPPs’. Cependant, ces valeurs et ces
intérêts permettent un certain taux de progrès dans la lutte contre les maladies liées à
la pauvreté – ce qui est nécessaire pour la possible réalisation des droits sociaux.
resumen
La Gestión de la Salud Global: Conflictos Sobre los Derechos
Sociales Globales
El siguiente trabajo analiza el impacto de las nuevas estructuras institucionales en la
gestión de la salud global sobre la realización de los derechos sociales en los países
pobres. En este documento tomamos en cuenta el ejemplo de la política del
SIDA/VIH. El artículo propone que los nuevos métodos de gestión aumentan la par-
ticipación de grupos de sociedad civil y de las comunidades afectadas, pero debate que
están frecuentemente instrumentalizadas por actores poderosos que buscan a seguir
sus propios intereses. De hecho, se movilizan más y más recursos en la lucha contra las
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enfermedades relacionadas con la pobreza. El documento concluye que – como sug-
iere nuestra experiencia con los conflictos sobre el ‘Acuerdo TRIPS’, la política del
SIDA/VIH, y el desarrollo de los ‘GPPPs’ – la gestión de la salud global está caracter-
izada por una combinación de valores morales e intereses materiales que no garantizan
una realización comprensiva de los derechos sociales. Permiten, sin embargo, algunos
avances en la lucha contra las enfermedades relacionadas con la pobreza – lo que es un
requisito para la posible realización de los derechos sociales.
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